

The new Security Studies and Soft power

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Abstract: Critical Security Studies is the most sustained and coherent critique of traditional Security Studies Especially the concept of Power. Critical Security Studies through has attempted to break away from the constraints of the western paradigms in order to truly understand the security concerns and their manifestations outside the West. In this article indexes of Critical Security Studies (CSS) such as Security Studies, Foundational Claims, Schools relate to Critical Security Studies and Soft Power, Achievements and Limitations, its Ethical Commitments and Future Pathways And New Framework for Critical Security Studies and meaning of power will analysis. [Afsane Reshad. **The new Security Studies and Soft power.** Journal of American Science 2011;7 (12):1031-1036]. (ISSN: 1545-1003). <http://www.americanscience.org>.

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Introduction:

Critical Security Studies is the most sustained and coherent critique of traditional Security Studies. (Booth, 2005:40). Security studies have been among the last bastions of neorealist orthodoxy in International Relations to accept critical, or even theoretically-sophisticated, challenges to its problematic. Recent polemical exchanges in the security studies literature have, however, at least linked the term "critical theory" with security studies, and although they do not necessarily advance the debate, they at least raise the question: what is a critical approach to security studies? My goal in this paper is not to invoke a new orthodoxy of "critical security studies" or to participate in polemical recriminations, but to illustrate what a critical engagement with issues and questions that have been taken as the subject matter of security studies involves. we do this in several steps:

a) A review of the (brief) debate in security studies concerning the contributions of "critical" scholarship;
 b) A presentation of the intellectual "foundations" of critical approaches to International Relations;
 c) An overview of current research within "critical security studies" that illustrates its ability to generate a challenging and productive research agenda;
 d) A discussion of the intellectual and disciplining power of mainstream security scholarship, and the difficulties this poses for critical challenges.² ultimately, this is healthy for security studies as a whole. Security studies continues to be treated by many scholars as a theoretically-impoverished cousin to the sturdy children of International Relations, which could include (depending on your preference) liberal and radical approaches to International Political Economy, neoliberal institutionalist analyses, regime theory, foreign policy analysis and so forth.⁴ Debate among competing approaches, and

a greater conceptual clarity, can only strengthen the claims of security studies scholars for intellectual respect. What is more, it is possible to argue that far from falling into desuetude with the end of the Cold War, many of the most interesting theoretical issues in International Relations - concerning, for example, identity politics and communal conflict, multilateral security institutions, the development of norms and practices, and so-called new issues (such as the environment) - can be most usefully studied through a prism labeled "security studies."

Soft power and Hard Power:

At the most general level, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants. There are several ways to affect the behavior of others.

- You can coerce them with threats.
- You can induce them with payments.
- Or you can attract or co-opt them (Nye, 2009:1-25).

Sometimes I can affect your behavior without commanding it. If you believe that my objectives are legitimate, I may be able to persuade you without using threats or inducements. For example, loyal Catholics may follow the Pope's teaching on capital punishment not because of a threat of excommunication, but out of respect for his moral authority. Or some radical Muslims may be attracted to support Osama bin Laden's actions not because of payments or threats, but because they believe in the legitimacy of his objectives (Nye, 2009:1-25) Practical politicians and ordinary people often simply define power as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes. Someone who has authority, wealth, or an attractive personality is called powerful. In international politics, by this second definition, we consider a country powerful if

it has a relatively large population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability.

The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable. Power in this sense is like holding the high cards in a card game. But when people define power as synonymous with the resources that produce it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those most endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want. For example, in terms of resources, the United States was the world's only superpower in 2001, but it failed to prevent September 11. Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge—witness Hitler in 1941 or Saddam Hussein in 1990. (Nye, 2009:1-25) Measuring power in terms of resources is imperfect but useful shorthand. It is equally important to understand which resources provide the best basis for power behavior in a particular context. Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age, nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age. Power resources cannot be judged without knowing the context. In some situations those who hold high office, command force, or possess wealth are not the most powerful. That is what revolutions are about.

Everyone is familiar with hard power. We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats ("sticks"). But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been called "the second face of power." A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them (Nye, 2009:1-25).

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives. Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Soft power is a staple of daily

democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.

If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency—not forces, not money—to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.

The interplay between hard and soft power

Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power—the ability to change what others do—can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power—the ability to shape what others want—can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda-setting to pure attraction. Soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behavior. Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other. A leader who courts popularity may be loath to exercise hard power when he should, but a leader who throws his weight around without regard to the effects on his soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of his hard power (Nye, 2009:1-25).

The limits of soft power

Some skeptics object to the idea of soft power because they think of power narrowly in terms of commands or active control. In their view, imitation

or attraction do not add up to power. Some imitation or attraction does not produce much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable outcomes. For example, armies frequently imitate and therefore nullify the successful tactics of their opponents and make it more difficult for them to achieve the outcomes they want. But attraction often does allow you to get what you want. The skeptics who want to define power only as deliberate acts of command and control are ignoring the second or "structural" face of power—the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behavior through threats or payments.

At the same time, it is important to specify the conditions under which attraction is more likely to lead to desired outcomes, and those when it will not. All power depends on context—who relates to whom under what circumstances—but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect of creating general influence, rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn upon in future circumstances (Nye, 2009:1-25).

Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honored, and diffuse reciprocity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant difference in obtaining favorable outcomes in bargaining situations. Otherwise leaders would insist only on immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and we know that is not always the way they behave. Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people under his rule, but he can often ignore popularity when he calculates his interests. In settings where opinions matter, leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003, because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity there. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan (Nye, 2009:1-25).

Critical security studies: Three Schools and Soft power

1- The Copenhagen School

In *People, States and Fear*, Buzan attempted to broaden and deepen the concept of security by including threat beyond the state and military e.g. economic, societal, and environmental and levels of threat that besides state includes the society and individuals. The Copenhagen School rejects the

viewpoint that security can be objectively given, but regards it as a social process applicable to any existential threat by any chosen referent object that requires exception measures. The action of securitizing is known as "...a speech act. By saying 'security', a state-representative moves the particular case into a specific area and thereby claim a special right to use the means necessary to block this development" (Wæver 1995: 55). The Copenhagen School has been criticized for not going far enough to totally break away from the realist state centric notion of security. Together with Wæver and de Wilde, Buzan have retained state-centrism by arguing that to securitize an issue is to render it "so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues" (Buzan, Ole Wæver & Wilde 1998: 29). The School is also accused of merely shifting to other positivist epistemology by labeling identity as having an 'essential character' (McSweeney 1996: 84) or as a given. While the military and political sectors, the referent object may be the state, in the societal sector the referent object is identity, or 'more specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom. While acknowledging that through a 'speech act' any referent object could be under threat and become a security concern, addressing of the threat by the state is to solve a security problem and not necessarily to encourage/realise emancipatory tendencies. Booth counters the state or society centric notion of security of the Copenhagen School by highlighting that 'it is illogical to spend excessive amounts of money and effort to protect the house against flood, dry rot and burglars if this is at the cost of the well-beings of the inhabitants' (Booth 1991: 320).

2- The Frankfurt School

The first meaning of the term critical theory was that defined by Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School of social science in his 1937 essay *Traditional and Critical Theory*. According Horkheimer and also Adorno, Critical theory seeks "to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them". For Horkheimer a capitalist society could become more democratic when 'all conditions of social life that are controllable by human beings depend on real consensus'. Horkheimer and Adorno, in the later works on *Dialectic Enlightenment* however presented a rather pessimistic view on whether humans will ever be able to overcome the power of instrumental rationality (material development) and achieve emancipation. An alternative approach to Critical theory of the Frankfurt School that broke away from

the production focus of the earlier proponents, was advanced by Habermas's discourse theory where decisions are made based on consensus arrived through discussions free from any domination. In his subsequent Theory of Communication, Habermas's argues that emancipatory potential is to be found in the realm of interaction of communication where great emphasis is on language. Alex Honneth a more contemporary critical theorist of Frankfurt School, further advanced Habermas ideas to take into account socio-cultural identities. As noted by Wyn Jones, 'while Honneth certainly concurs with the broad thrust of Habermas's communicative turn, that is, the attempt to locate emancipatory potential and politics in the realm of interaction rather than work – he disassembles from Habermas's stress on language (Jones 2005: 225) towards a theory of recognition. Overall the Frankfurt School approach is essentially emancipatory in nature. All of them want to improve the human life from a social perspective. While Horkheimer and Adorno may have come from a Marxist perspective of responding to dangers of capitalism, Habermas was prepared to advance social reforms within the modern capitalistic world through active communication. Honneth through theory of recognition further refined the approach by incorporating the interplay of identities in the social world. They all strive to shape this world from a liberating human perspective. My take is that while the Frankfurt School's origins may have been Marxian, over the years it has moved towards a blend of normative and with post modernist rationalizations. In , *The Changing Contour*, Linklater highlights that there is very little difference between Habermasians' normative stress on 'unconstrained communication' to Lyotard's support for 'equal rights of participation in a universal speech of community'.

3- The Welsh School

Inspired by the Frankfurt School's notion of emancipation and disillusioned by the realists to explain post Cold War, the Welsh School, and especially Ken Booth, makes it absolutely clear that emancipation, not power or order is the goal of studying security. "Security" means the absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, and political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. (Booth 1991: 319)

Future of Critical Security Study (CSS)

Although the above discussion has focused on elaborating strengths and weaknesses in the Copenhagen School and Welsh School our contention is that they are reflective of critical security studies in general. In terms of the politics of security we have argued that there is a tendency to work with Universalist assumptions about what politics does, whether this is viewed positively or negatively. Meanwhile, normatively we have suggested the existence of a shared but relatively weak and certainly undertheorised liberal ethical commitment – not least towards opening space for deliberation and dialogue. Most theorists working in post-structural, Paris School and feminist traditions consistently express similar concerns outlined above about the negative and exclusionary practices associated with contemporary security politics, and endorse opening up the discursive space in which security policies undertaken on behalf of a community are developed. Some within these traditions even explicitly promote a normative concern with emancipation, even if not understood in exactly the same way as Booth. For Richard Wyn Jones this is not surprising, as 'some concept of emancipation is a necessary element of any form of analysis that attempts to problematize and criticize the status quo' (original emphasis). None of this is to elide the important differences between these approaches, but rather to suggest the need to put these differences in broader perspective. However, the failure to develop a really clear, sophisticated and contextual account of the politics of security, combined with a failure to articulate a clear and sophisticated conception of what constitutes progress in terms of security practices and contexts is vitally important as it leaves us short of a compelling rationale (either on analytical or normative grounds) for critical security studies other than as a means of critique. Hence the question of whether critical security studies can provide anything beyond this. Without pretending to be able to lay out a comprehensive agenda for the future of critical security studies the remainder of this paper suggests a series of pathways around which such theorisations might begin to emerge. In the spirit of immanent critique these pathways build on openings already in the literature, but suggest where more work is needed. (S. Browning, 2010: 14 - 15).

Human emancipation is often cited as the ultimate goal of the CSS project. Kenneth Booth defines human emancipation as "the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural oppressions...the concept of emancipation shapes strategies and tactics of

resistance, offers a theory of progress for society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity.”

For Booth then, human emancipation is a concern with questioning and changing structures and institutions that oppress us and prevent us from reaching our true potential, a seemingly Marxist and poststructuralist concern. Emancipation and security become two sides of the same coin for Booth, as humans must be freed from their oppressive structures and overthrow physical and human constraints that prevent them from reaching their true potential. However, emancipation is not the end-all solution but a project that can never be fully realized. This may lead some to question the practicality of the concept. Here, I will draw an analogy from Karl Marx, whose idea of human emancipation was communism, a goal that we can see in the horizon, but the closer we get to it, the further away it seems. Yet, when we look back, we see how far we have come. Therefore, human emancipation serves practical purpose as an imminent critique, which can be utilized as a philosophical anchorage for tactical goal setting.

Critics, usually cultural relativists, have derided human emancipation for being a new Western imposition on “Third World” and developing nations, as a way to colonize and control these countries. However, freedom from fear, freedom to live without state repression, freedom to live up to one’s true potential without any barriers and the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are not only Western ideals. These are human ideals, which also do not originate only in the West as Enlightenment scholars would like us to believe. There should be no doubt that cultural relativism is a critically useful concept, especially since the use of it allows us to celebrate our differences instead of engaging in otherizing behavior. However, human rights and freedoms are not relative and all too often, we find that people are oppressed under the false cloak of cultural relativism. Human emancipation does entail cultural relativism for it is important to advance a universal concept of human security free from ethnocentrism and ideologies.

Additionally, any project on human emancipation should come with a recognition that international relations and the state are not non-gendered, but highly gendered male-dominated institutions of power that exclude women from discussions about their own security. The patriarchal domination of women in the private sphere extends into the male-dominated public sphere. In this case, de-centering the state as the referent object of security is supported by a large segment of feminist security studies as “[national] security (in terms of masculinist modes of domination) secures patriarchal

relations of power and renders women insecure precisely because they are women...” Security becomes what men in the national security state make of it. Violence against women, sending their children to war, the raping of woman as a demonstration of power and militarized masculinities pose security problems for women that any alternate framework of security should deeply consider. (Perna 2006, 21-22).

Conclusion:

Critical security studies has been constructed as a subdiscipline of international relations but also exists as a transdisciplinary subfield in which disparate research can connect over some common epistemological, methodological and empirical commitments. Critical Security Studies is the most sustained and coherent critique of traditional Security Studies. Critical Security Studies through the likes of Ayoob, Thomas, Acharya and Wilkinson, has attempted to break away from the constraints of the western paradigms in order to truly understand the security concerns and their manifestations outside the West. Unfortunately, the outcome of this attempt has been a flawed understanding of the problematique. The main conclusion is that the concept of security is now genuinely contested: as part of this contestation, it required that concepts, such as the state, community, emancipation, as well as the relationships, such as those between the individual and their society and between economics and politics, are also subject to contestation. Critical Security Studies, defined more generally, consist of alternatives rejection of realism, but it does not add up to an alternative theory. The Krause and Williams note a mixture of positions posing an alternative to realism and thus offers a much wider perspective on security studies. And while the advantage of this is a wide-ranging critique of the traditional literature, the price is that there is less likelihood of an agreement on how to reconceptualize security. Thus can claims that Critical Security Studies have position and place in international relations. This day the revolution development that in the Middle East (North Africa) occurs can perspective analyzed of the Critical Security Studies and the factors of CSS such as emancipation and human security. In the future we will witness that the world go to use emancipation, integration and the human security. In the conclude of will influence of the Critical Security Studies as the mainstreams in the large scale in international relations.

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