

Militancy And State-Dialogue On Insecurity In Africa: The Case Of Nigeria's Boko Haram

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Abstract: The unprecedented emergence of violence and insecurity in Nigeria is a replication of the occurrences in the Middle East and what is glaringly obtainable in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other places in the world. The paper captures the concept of militancy and how it relates to the government of a state in maintaining security and protection of the civilians and their properties. The paper analyzes some of the fundamental ways through which militancy may emanate and how the state can halt or foil the militant activities. It tries to choose among all possible approaches of arresting violence using the best alternative method in the state. The paper is a result of critical-descriptive research which adopts content instrument of analysis for scientific submissions. The paper discovers that militancy is not the creation of the militants per se, but the creation of conglomerated forces that result in the militancy. The paper however, concludes that the Boko Haram uprising has not been properly addressed by the Nigerian government and only the wrong way has been taken, which is the refusal to hold discussions with members of the sect, due to some intervening variables. The paper also recommends proper dialogue with the Boko Haram members, amnesty and rehabilitation be considered.

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Introduction

It is not surprising the outbreak of mayhem and upheavals in a society that is enveloped by injustice, inequality, poverty and illiteracy. A society that does not respect rule of law and constitutional rights; a society built on impunity and absence of separation of powers; a society ruled and controlled by a party oligarchy and gradually transforming into an aristocratic polity will never be devoid of violence, rebellion or revolution.

Nigeria as a country has been characterized by different periodic and sporadic conflicts since after the attainment of self government. The military interregnum was ethnically and regionally motivated, which later gravitated the secession of Biafra and the subsequent civil war (biafran war) which was fought between the federal government and the people of Igbo nationality from the eastern part of the country.

With the twilight of the Biafra war, other events that were distasteful to Nigerians were the continuous military intervention in the political life of the nation, which instigated a drawback and lack of national development due to corruption, nepotism and regionalism among other things.

The second most violent era especially in the north was the Maitatsine uprising in Kano state. Maitatsine was a name used to describe a Cameroonian who migrated to Nigeria and died in 1980. Maitatsine claimed to be a prophet and later organized a revolt with his followers in Kano in 1980 which led to the death of 4177 including Maitatsine himself (Isichei, 1987, 194-208).

In 1982, similarly, his followers organized another uprising at Bulumkutu, 15 kilometers away from Maiduguri, which also claimed the lives of 3350. Kaduna state was not left behind; violence broke out at Rigasa which later covered the main city of the state. There was a revolt in Yola in 1984 which killed between 500 and 1000 lives and violence in Gombe in 1985, in which over 100 lives were also lost (Isichei, 1987, 194-208).

The kafanchan crisis among students of different religions, which later spilled outside the college of education kafanchan, was another unforgettable violence in the Nigerian book of history. The crisis has resulted in the killings of many lives and properties of great value destroyed (Jibrin, 1989:65-82).

The Zongon kataf crisis was yet another bloody one in the history of Nigeria. It all started in Kaduna state in May 1992, where clashes erupted between the native villagers of zongo and Hausa-fulanis. The crisis entered almost all the major areas in the state killing thousands of people. The crisis was tribal in nature, it later developed in to ethno-religious one (Sandah, 2013, 1-2).

There emerged another bloody religious crisis popularly known as Shariah crisis in 1999 and the year 2000. In these crises however, the most notable was the one that erupted on the 21st of February, 2000, in which more than 3000 lives were said to have perished, aside properties worth billions of naira that were lost (Aruwan, 2011).

It all occurred after the public hearing of the Committee of the State House of Assembly, and the series of seminars by the various religious groups, where CAN Kaduna Branch, organized a public protest on February 21, 2000 against what they called the “planned introduction of Sharia in the state.” During the protest, Christians expressed their fears concerning what they perceived as an attempt to “Islamize Kaduna State” and the possibility of such action generating crisis in Kaduna (Africa confidential, 2001). The peaceful protest later turned violent: Muslim youths clashed with the Christian protesters, and fighting between Christians and Muslims spiraled out of control, with massive violence and destruction on both sides (Aruwan, 2011).

The Sharia violence in Kaduna took place in two main waves, sometimes referred to as “Sharia 1” and “Sharia 2” (Paden, 2005). The first wave took place in Kaduna city, as stated above, from February 21 to 25, with further killings in March, followed by a second wave from May 22 to 23. On Wednesday 23 March 2000, the crisis spilled over to outlying LGAs, particularly Kachia and Birnin Gwari. In Kachia LGA, Muslims were attacked; their residential houses, shops, clinics, courts, filling stations and markets were destroyed. It later, spilled to neighboring villages like Sakainu, Katul, Adadgai, Slowai, and Gumel (Abdu and Umar, 2002).

The May “Sharia 2” violence occurred while the Judicial Commission of Inquiry set up to probe February’s clashes, was yet to complete its work. The clash started at Narayi and Banarwa areas and later spreaded to other parts of the city (Aruwan, 2011). While the immediate cause of the crisis could not be fully ascertained, Police say the clashes broke out after residents of a mainly Christian neighborhood blamed Muslims for the killing of a local man (Africa confidential, 2001).

For the purpose of this paper however, militancy is the major area that the paper seeks to investigate. But we must understand some major militant groups in Nigeria with tribal, ethnic or regional connotations. Some of the major ethnic militia groups in Nigeria that have terrorized regional peace are: the Egbesu boys of Africa (EBA) the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and the Arewa People Congress (APC) (Badmus, 2006:191-198).

Theoretical Exposition

The theory of International Terrorism best explains the topic under study, because it deals with militancy and state-dialogue in Africa, enveloping the Nigeria’s Boko Haram as a point of departure. In the

writings of Alikhan (2006), the theory studies Islamic militancy in the geopolitical contexts of Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine, the September 11 attacks on the United States and its extension to other areas of the world such as Africa, having the same context.. These contexts have shaped a global ontology of Islamic terrorism, which asserts that puritan Islam is inherently violent and Muslim militants are addicted to carnage. This ontology is significantly changing international law. It defends the preemptive war on terror and disregards civil liberties, prescribing extra-judicial killings, torture, renditions, indefinite detentions, and numerous other human rights violations. These normative shifts are considered inevitable to suppress Muslim militants. Questioning these shifts, Alikhan (2006) argues that “the policy of no negotiations with Muslim militants is contrary to the UN Charter...terrorism cannot be eradicated unless the Nation-State evolves into the Free State” (Alikhan, 2006).

The Boko Haram militant activity however, is not unconnected with what Alikhan (2006) describes as carnage, but this is the result of the militant voluntary action, but what we are very much concerned about is the causal factors of such carnage and militancy.

Factors That Instigate/ Promote Militancy The Anarchist approach

Anarchism connotes an ideology signifying a social construction of the absence of state, law and order. They believe that the state is evil, and they move towards the destruction of the state. For Gordon (2007), the architecture of today’s anarchist movement can be described as a decentralized network of communication, coordination and mutual support among autonomous nodes of social struggle. Lacking any one centre or permanent channels of interaction, this architecture has been likened to that of a “rhizome” — the stemless, bulbous root-mass of plants like potato or bamboo — a structure based on principles of connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity and non-linearity (Cleaver 1998, Sheller 2000, Adams 2002, Chesters 2003, Jeppesen 2004). The metaphor is borrowed from the discussion of knowledge in Deleuze and Guattari 1987:7–13).

Some of the driving tenets of the anarchists, according to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) may include the following:

- (a) Kill the intelligentsia (kill those who are intelligent and most energetic in society)
- (b) Kidnap the rich and powerful (those who will yield the biggest ransoms)
- (c) Infiltrate the politicians (to find out their secrets and discredit them)

- (d) Help the guilty criminals (to confuse society over justice and punishment)
- (e) Defend the loudmouths (those who make dangerous declarations)
- (f) Nurture the supporters (help fellow travelers who believe in societal destruction)
- (g)

The Fascist approach

Fascism is a form of government, belief system or religion with the most disagreement about a definition for it. However, Passmore (2002) attempts a definition as the consolidation of an ultranationalist ideology that is unabashedly racist. The word comes from the Latin "fasces" which means to use power to scare or impress people. It generally refers to the consolidation of all economic and political power into some form of super-patriotism that is devoted to genocide or endless war with one's enemies.

Religion and Extremism

Many criminologists have pointed out that the disciplines of theology, religion, and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism (Stitt 2003; Kraemer 2004). It is also a fact that about a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the most dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns (Hoffman 1993).

The Economic Theory of Rational Choice and Militancy

In the analysis of Nyatepe-coo (2004), the discipline of economics has many concepts that are relevant to an understanding of terrorism. The concepts of supply and demand, costs and benefits for example are influential. Fully-developed economic or econometric models of terrorism are quite rare, and often involve such things as "psychic" costs and benefits (Nyatepe-Coo 2004). More down-to-earth economic theories can be found in the literature on deterrence. Rational choice theory, in particular, has found a place in criminology, and holds that people will engage in crime after weighing the costs and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice about motivation after perceiving that the chances of gain outweigh any possible punishment or loss.

Globalization

Globalization according to Nassar (2004), contributes to dreams, fantasies, and rising expectations, but at the same time, it leads to dashed hopes, broken dreams, and unfulfilled achievements. Terrorism breeds in the gap between expectations and achievements (Nassar, 2004).

The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is the idea that every frustration (not being able to engage in some behavior) leads to some form of aggression, and that every aggressive act relieves that frustration to some extent (Gurr, 1970).

The Relative Deprivation Approach

The relative deprivation hypothesis is the idea that as a person goes about choosing their values and interests; they compare what they have and don't have, as well as what they want or don't want, with real or imaginary others. The observation or perception of deprivation is what matters, as well as an environment of rising expectations. The person then usually perceives a discrepancy between what is possible for them and what is possible for others, and reacts to it with an inflamed sense of injustice. (Davies, 1962).

The Negative Identity Factor

The negative identity factor is the idea that, for whatever reason, a person develops a vindictive and covert rejection of the roles and statuses laid out for them by their family, community, or society.

The Narcissistic Rage Synthesis

The narcissistic rage Synthesis is an umbrella idea for all the numerous things that can go wrong in child-rearing, such as too much smothering, too little smothering, ineffective discipline, overly stringent discipline, psychological trauma, coming from a broken home, etc., that all leads to the same effect of a "What about Me?" reaction in the child.

The moral disengagement hypothesis is the idea that encompasses all the ways a person neutralizes or removes any inhibitions they have about committing acts of horrific violence. Some common patterns include imagining one's self as a hero, portraying one's self as a functionary, minimizing the harm done, dehumanizing the victim, or insulating one's self in routine activities. (hacker, 1996).

Psychological Factor

Stern (1999) who attempts to gain psychological insight into the distinction between "doomsday" terrorists, who would use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that might end all life on earth, and "dangerous" terrorists, who would limit themselves to the conventional arsenal of terrorism. Stern's concern is primarily with the counter proliferation of WMD, but cases studies of groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, the Tamil Tigers and Al-Qaida show that terrorists most likely to use WMD tend to be afflicted with paranoia and megalomania. Of these two illnesses, the megalomania is more severe, and the paranoia is at such a moderate level that it enhances their intelligence and keeps them from

becoming schizophrenics or sociopaths. Stern (1999) takes exception with arguments that terrorists suffer from any antisocial, psychopathic, or sociopathic disorder. Likewise, Victoroff (2005) says even though there is no such thing as a terrorism questionnaire (no one has validated a terrorism quotient or found a terrorist gene), it might be promising to measure their sense of oppression and feeling of subjugation, but one would have to account for the deep levels of fervor, hatred, bravado and other psychodynamic pressures at work.

Biological Factor

Hubbard (1983) was one of the first biological researchers of terrorism, and his line of work is similar to the familiar cycle of violence hypothesis in criminal justice. In this view, people who commit repetitive and cyclical acts of violence (which would include wife beaters, rapists, and serial killers) are driven by hormonal or petrochemical fluctuations in their body or brain chemistry. (Wison, 1975; Daly and Wilson, 1994).

The Boko Haram Militant Group

Boko Haram is an Arabic term which means western education is a sin. It emerged with a new ideology which condemns western education, public service under the government, schooling etc as the system allows for the mixture of both men and women which paves a way for atrocities to be committed. The major belief sees the means and process of acquiring western education as unethical, not the knowledge itself. The means and process of public service does not protect religious, cultural and moral values hence the whole process is seen as evil.

The group was first formed in the 1990s under various names led initially by Abubakar Lawan and later by the pseudonymous Aminu Tashen-Ilimi (“the reign of knowledge”). However, a coherent group identity could not be established until the emergence of Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic Nigerian cleric gained prominence among local youths in Maiduguri, Borno’s capital. By 2003, Yusuf led a movement espousing a more conservative theology. (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012).

The group is now called Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (“people committed to the propagation of the Sunnah and Jihad” (Onuoha, 2012). The group was initially peaceful, only preaching and teaching people about the ideology. It reached to a point where some of their members were attacked by the Nigerian security operatives, which later led to their ideological shift from non-violence to carrying up weapons and began to fight the Nigerian government. Initially, the group was attacking only security and civil servants, but later, any body who

preaches against their belief and ideology (Onuoha, 2012).

In the late 2004, the group began to consolidate under the leadership of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf into what is popularly known as BH (Cook, 2011). Yusuf was a long-term Islamic activist, who promoted strict adherence to Islam and fostered a rejectionist group ideology (Onuoha, 2012). In July 2009, the group engaged in violent rioting that spread across north-eastern Nigeria and left 800 people dead, including Yusuf (Adesoji, 2010; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012). After a year-long period of inactivity, the group became active again (Cook, 2011), and since late 2010 has been engaged in more frequent and destructive violence (Onuoha, 2012).

The major objective of the group is to overthrow the secular Nigerian government and establish an Islamic state under Sharia law (Adesoji, 2010). Although the group’s ideology is framed in the discursive language of jihad, its motivation can be linked back to worldly grievances. Modern Nigeria is beset by endemic problems of corruption, poverty and political discontent, which are particularly prevalent in the northern states where the dominant religion is Islam (Lewis, 2011). The failure of the Nigerian government to dialogue with members of the group has led to the death of more than 3000 Nigerians and their properties of high value vanished (vanguard, 2012).

Identifying Other Militant Groups In Africa

Applying this terrain-method approach provides us with insights into some of the more prominent militant movements that emerged during the 1990s. For example, in the mid-1990s the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group in Uganda comprised of self-identified “religious crusaders” from the Muslim Tabliq sect opposing the government carried out terrorist attacks against local civilians and internally displaced persons in particular. The ADFs were based in western Uganda, along the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here they took advantage of the terrain and local context by “setting up rear bases in neighboring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and education” (James and Giroux, 2011:1-8). This location enabled them to operate and move fluidly between Uganda and the DRC, the latter of which was suspected of providing support. Attacks varied from the use of brutal force and assaults to kidnapping and hostage-taking of youths who would then be forced to assist the ADF (James and Giroux, 2011:1-8).

In the case of abductions, two notable attacks took place in 1998, one involving the kidnapping of 30 students from the Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist

College in Kasese, the other involving the abduction of more than 100 school children from Hoima district (James and Giroux, 2011:1-8). In another, more brutal, display of terror, ADF rebels killed 80 students of the Kichwamba Technical College in the Kabarole district by setting locked dormitories on fire (James and Giroux, 2011:1-8). It was also documented that the ADF's violent campaign peaked between 1997 and 2001 with "48 explosive devices detonated in and around Kampala, killing approximately 50 and injuring an estimated 200 people" (Anneli, 2004:66). The government was finally able to defeat and disband the group in 2004.

In another example in Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – which dates back to 1987 – has carried out numerous atrocities directed at civilians in its nearly 25-year campaign in the northern region. Operating as an ideologically apocalyptic Christian group opposing the central government, its *modus operandi* has been to use violence or the threat of violence to intimidate and instill fear in the Ugandan people and, more specifically, the Acholi tribe. Though its objectives are not always clear, the decades of indiscriminate violence with political undertones have made this group one of the more well-known rebel groups using terrorism as a method in their campaign (Leonard, 2011). Furthermore, it has used the structural weaknesses of its host environment to diffuse across multiple borders, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) (Martin, 2009). Overall, the ADF and LRA are examples of two non-state, religiously and politically motivated groups that have caused at least 10,000 deaths in their respective campaigns (Matthias, George and John, 1990:14).

Similarly, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which operated throughout much of the 1990s, was a militant group based in Sierra Leone that sought to overthrow the government. Its membership pool and financial support blurred the boundaries between the country and Liberia, while its activities included politically motivated attacks on local communities in an effort to induce widespread fear and submission. Its decade-long policy of youth abductions to build ranks and attacks that involved cutting off hands, arms, and legs of civilians and government troops resulted in thousands of child soldiers and amputees by 2002 (James and Giroux, 2011:1-8).

On the other side of the continent, Somalia's situation is looking ever-more grim, with daily violence a tragically consistent part of life. Furthermore, South Africa continues to experience some periodic episodes of political violence from both domestic and regional groups. For instance, in the mid-1990s Cape Town experienced a number of bombings

and attacks on popular tourist spots that local officials attributed to the organization "People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)." Another group, Die Boeremag, claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in 2002 on transportation infrastructure and religious temples in Soweto. More recently, in the run up to the 2010 World Cup, authorities foiled a plot by extremists linked to Somalia and Mozambique to attack the event. Shortly after, AQIM issued a threat in April 2010 to target the major international soccer event (James and Giroux, 2011:1-8).

Few others may include the Ansaruddeen and AQIM in Northern Mali, Ansaruddeen in Northern Nigeria, the Niger delta militants of southern Nigeria, the Tuaregs in Northern Mali and many more to mention.

Sources/Methods Of Conflict Resolution

In the submission of Lincoln (1998:1-4) the following methods are essential in conflict resolution:

Negotiation

Negotiation is the most basic means of settling differences. It is back-and-forth communication between the parties to the conflict with the goal of trying to find a solution.

Mediation

Mediation is a voluntary process in which an impartial person (the mediator) helps with communication and promotes reconciliation between the parties which will allow them to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Mediation often is the next step if negotiation proves unsuccessful.

Arbitration:

Arbitration is the submission of a disputed matter to an impartial person (the arbitrator) for decision. The Process: Arbitration is typically an out-of-court method for resolving a dispute. The arbitrator controls the process, will listen to both sides and make a decision. Like a trial, only one side will prevail. Unlike a trial, appeal rights are limited.

Litigation (Going To Court)

Definition: Litigation is the use of the courts and civil justice system to resolve legal controversies. The Process: Litigation is begun by filing a lawsuit in a court. Specific rules of procedure, discovery and presentation of evidence must be followed. The attorney for the other side will want to take your deposition to learn more about the facts as you see them and your position in the case. There can be a number of court appearances by you and/or your lawyer. If the parties cannot agree how to settle the case, either the judge or a jury will decide the dispute for you through a trial.

Other Methods For Conflict Management

In the writings of Robbins (1990:599), Whetten, Cameron and Woods (1996:98), conflicts can be managed through the following ways:

1. **Avoidance:** this method indicates absence of any action. This also includes withdrawal and suppression. This method can be used as an interim strategy to allow the parties to cool down. At times, avoidance until more information is available or until an analysis of the problem has been made, is the most productive approach. Temporarily avoiding a situation is also helpful if the issue is relatively unimportant, or if there is not enough time available for bringing about a resolution, or if the issue is thought to be only a symptom of a more extensive problem that must be dealt with later.
2. **Authoritative command:** this method forces the conflicting parties to accept a solution which is devised by the higher-ups in the hierarchy. This becomes possible by virtue of formal positional hierarchy and authority that exist in organizations.
3. **Defusion:** this strategy involves postponement of or delaying the decisions with a view to cool down the intensity and thus avoids escalation or open hostility. This approach involves focusing on unnecessary issues, thereby avoiding the main problem for sometime.
4. **Smoothing:** this approach plays down the differences while emphasizing on the common interests. This method emphasizes the co-operative efforts.
5. **Appealing to super ordinate Goals:** this method focuses the attention on the higher goals that the conflicting groups share or the long-range aims that the groups have in common. The method emphasizes that these goals must be highly valued and cannot be obtained without the help of all the parties/groups involved in the conflict.
6. **Using Representatives:** this approach helps to contain the conflict. In order to decide an issue, it is always better to meet the representatives of the opposing groups rather than dealing with the groups per se. This is mainly because the representatives know the problems well and can argue the points of view of the group more precisely. As this process could lead to rejection of the representatives by the group members, it may be better to use group representatives from each side to overcome individual anxiety about group rejection.
7. **Altering Structural Variables:** this approach changes structural variables. It includes transferring and exchanging group members and expanding the group or organization's boundaries. Structuring the interaction between the groups can be effective in resolving conflicts. Many a times, decreasing the amount of direct interaction between the groups early

in the conflict helps to prevent the conflict from escalating. Role reversal for people between interdependent departments could also reduce conflict.

8. **Negotiation:** this approach requires each party to give up something of value. People negotiate because of self-interest. Negotiation, as a process for conflict resolution, necessarily centers on the issue on which the two parties are in conflict and not their relationship in total. It is an approach where both sides walk towards each other to reach a mutually acceptable position. In this process, it is quite but natural that each party expects the other to not only walk faster but also with bigger steps. It is, thus, possible that negotiation may sometimes result in a compromise and sometimes in a deadlock.

9. **Problem Solving/Confrontation/Collaboration:** this method seeks resolution through face-to-face confrontation of the conflicting parties. The conflicting parties seek mutual problem definition, assessment of the problem, and the solution. In this approach, there is an open expression of feelings as well as exchange of task-related information.

10. **Reducing Task Inter-dependence:** reducing task interdependence between groups and assigning clear work responsibilities to each group is one of the ways of redesigning organizations. This is an effective method to resolve inter-group conflicts.

11. **Expansion of Resources:** one of the ways to manage conflicts, arising out of competition for limited resources, is to expand or increase the availability of scarce resources.

12. **Altering the Human Variable:** this method helps to change the attitudes and behavior of one or more of the conflicting parties. This includes use of education, sensitivity and awareness training, and human relations training.

13. **Establishing Rules and Procedures:** this approach calls for establishing, in advance, a set of formalized rules and procedures that will specify how group members are to interact with each other.

14. **Establishing Liaison Roles:** Liaison role refers to individuals with specialized roles designed to facilitate communication between two interdependent work groups. This could help reduce the intergroup conflicts.

15. **Identifying a Common Enemy:** Studies indicate that groups can temporarily resolve their conflicts to combat a common enemy. Thus, by presenting a common threat, the conflicts can be pushed to the background.

HOW MAJOR MILITANT CONFLICTS WERE SOLVED IN AFRICA

In showing how some of the major African militant conflicts were solved in Africa, Kutesa (2009:3-8) has identified some countries under which such conflicts occurred. These countries included the

democratic republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia.

The Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (1998): That conflict, pitting the government of Congo and armed militant groups opposed to it, sucked in neighboring countries of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola as well as Zimbabwe and Namibia. There were outcries of invasion of the DRC by the neighboring countries and rebellion by the Congolese rebel groups. Ultimately, all the parties sat together in a regional effort and considered all internal and external dimensions to the conflict. The resultant Lusaka Peace Agreement addressed the concerns of the militant groups and those of the neighboring countries. Consequently, forces of neighboring countries withdrew and eventually, elections were held in the DRC.

Burundi

In Burundi, regional efforts, under the chairmanship of President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, delivered the Arusha Peace Agreement of 2000, facilitated by the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and later former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and then South African Vice President Jacob Zuma. The consistent regional efforts eventually brought on board the two remaining armed groups; namely the CNDD and the FNL/Palipehutu. Burundi has been a classic example of the success of regional efforts, and also an example that incremental progress can build into a concrete solution.

Sudan

Under the auspices of the regional organization, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) negotiated and concluded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The negotiation yielded a fruitful results dealing with especially those issues related to border demarcation, sharing of oil revenue, the status of Abyei, operationalization of the Joint Integrated Units, elections and the referendum (to decide whether Southern Sudan remains part of Sudan or secedes), and finally the state of southern Sudan was created.

Somalia

Somalia is another conflict that our region has been handling. Under the auspices of IGAD, the warring Somali parties negotiated and signed a Charter in Nairobi in 2006, for power sharing. This brought in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) including the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). Another agreement signed in August 2008, the Djibouti

Agreement, brought in a new opposition armed group (The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia) and establishment of a new Government. The change of Government in the circumstances was democratically done. The new President in Somalia, Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, has committed himself to the promotion of dialogue with the insurgent groups.

The Necessity for Dialoguing With Boko Haram

The current situation in Northern Nigeria as students do not go to school any more for fear of attacks from the Boko Haram group, law makers are in hiding, business men and women have fled the state, companies closed, innocent people are dying on the daily basis, government is highly preoccupied in security dilemma, no vision as what program to execute other than security, has dominated the political, social and economic spheres of Nigeria. People are not safe in the federal capital, in the middle belt and even in the south-south.

The only panacea to such mayhem is dialogue, for it stresses a long term perspective on the crisis and proffer solution to it; dialogue recognizes one another's interest and right to exist; dialogue entails learning not just talking; dialogue is also an inclusive process, for it benefits not only the warring or conflicting parties, but even the general public (UNDP, 2009:2-5).

Conclusion

The Nigerian government has apparently refused to hold talks with the members of Boko Haram group, due to some certain faulty intelligence reports and security miscalculations. It is a well known fact that the United States and Great Britain after years of fighting in Afghanistan and the quantum of loss made in both cash and the lives of US and British troops, no gains calculated but rather a sheer military and presidential fiasco. The US government is now bidding for talks and dialogue with the Taliban, which was confirmed by the Taliban office opened in Qatar.

Recommendation

The paper was written to provide some salient techniques through which the Boko Haram insurgency will become history in Nigeria. These areas recommended by the paper are:

There is need for amnesty rendered to the entire members of the group, which will enable them come out from hiding in order to face reality and engage with the federal government.

After amnesty rendered, members of the group also need rehabilitation. This may include areas of skill acquisition, training and scholarship to further education. The education could be western or Islamic education.

The demolished houses of members of the group must be reconstructed and their mosques rebuilt, to ensure permanent peace in the state.

Members of the group should be absorbed in to the political system to ensure proper political participation. This may involve their deployment to serve in the religious institutions of the state.

One major consideration to be made is on compensation of what members of the group have lost in the violence. This may ensure more economic reliance and independence in the society where the members come from.

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